Fee contracts are an important means to control con-
flicts of interest between Investment Bankers
(I-Bank) known as the agents and client firms known as the
principals in the business world. But in
the business press and in the academic world, often the focus of
debate has been on the potential for these conflicts.
In Merger and Acquisitions (M&A) Tender Offers (TO),
there are four leading players: The bidding firm or the buyer firm, who
is making the offer, and the target firm or the seller firm,
whose shares will be purchased and the two agents representing the
two sides. That is each of the principal firms, has its own I-Bank who
is acting as the agent of the client firm during the TO transaction.
The most important aspect of this relationship is the fee contract
between the client firm and the I-Bank which ultimately incorporates
the potential preferences of both the parties- the firm and the I-Bank
or, the principal and the agent.
Initially, everything depends upon the form of the contract
between the firm and the I-Bank which is independent of the
fee incentives motivations which lead them to these contracts. This
is, because in the competitive market, a good reputation
(reputation definitely has a mitigating effect on the agency problem) is
fundamental to survival, and quite a portion of new clients are
acquired, based on referrals/word-of-mouth. But ultimately, the
attributes in the contract with reference to the fee incentives has
a guiding effect on the I-Bank to vary the offer attributes,
transaction outcomes. |